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PETITION FOR REHEARING OF RESPONDENTS
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPOF.TATION AND
DAVIS AND WEBER COUNTIES

Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court, the Respondents Utah Department of Transportation, Davis
and Weber Counties respectfully petitions for rehearing of the
opinion of this Court filed November 9, 1989 which reversed the
decision of the Trial Court.

Counsel certifies this Petition is

presented in good faith and not for delay.
It is always disconcerting to litigants when a decision
by a Trial Court which was rendered fairly is reversed by the
Court of Appeals and its decision is, from all appearances a
result oriented and went far beyond that which the parties ever
requested or what was argued in their briefs.
POINT I
IT APPEARS THE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A
DECISION TO REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT AND
QUIET TITLE IN THE APPELLANTS AND THEN
PROCEEDED TO IGNORE WHATEVER FACTS IN
THE RECORD THAT WERE TO THE CONTRARY.
The Respondent on page two of its brief indicated in
the last paragraph that "... The Lower Court bifurcated the trial
of the issues in this case.

It was determined to first try the

issue of whether the property was located in Weber County.

If

the Appellants lost on this issue, which they did, there was no
reason to then try the issue of whether the Respondent Davis
County conducted the tax sale property."

A reading of the

Appellants' brief does not indicate any objection with this
statement.

This Court sua sponte in its footnote 2 on page 4

found because this Court could not find a ruling on the bifurcation issue in any order which it could find, ruled an abandonment
of this defense on the part of the Respondent UDOT.

(A copy of

page 4 is attached as Exhibit "A")
The Appellate Court referred on many occasions in its
decision to the trial of the earlier case of Toone v. LeGrande
Johnson Construction Co., Civil No. 20915 (Davis District Court).
The Toone and Baxter cases involved the exact same issues, but
only between different parties.

The Plaintiff-Appellants (R.

124-130) specifically referred to the trial of the Toone case and
indicate the issues were bifurated and attached a copy of the
pretrial Order.

From the foregoing it was always assumed by the

parties that the present action would also be bifurated.

It

would be a total exercise in futility to try the issue of whether
the tax sale was conducted properly by the Respondent Davis
County, if the subject property was found to not be located in
Davis County.

Finally, on page 16 of the proceedings before

Judge Roth on August 4, 1986, the attorney for Respondent Utah
Department of Transportation makes specific reference to the
bifurcation of the issues in this case by talking about what
issues are to be tried in the first trial.
Exhibit "B")
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(Copy attached as

Finally, the Plaintiff-Appellant never disputed the
statement contained in the Defendant-Respondent Utah Department
of Transportation's brief that in fact the issues in this case
have been bifurcated.

It can only constitute a sheer abuse of

discretion and a definite prejudice against the DefendantsRespondents for the Appellate Court to conclude that the
Defendant-Respondent Utah Department of Transportation abandoned
its defense of whether the tax sale by the Respondent Davis
County was conducted properly.
The Respondents cite the case of UDOT v. Glen E.
Fuller, 603 P.2d 814 (1979).

In this case the Defendant who was

acting pro se attempted to introduce evidence before the Supireme
Court which had not been argued in the Lower Court.

The Supreme

Court would not allow the Defendants to argue for the first time
evidence which was being heard for the first time on the appeal.
By this reasoning it would be totally improper for the Appellate
Court to now consider and rule on evidence which was not raised
or controverted by the Plaintiff Respondents.
POINT II
THE APPELLATE COURT WRONGLY CONCLUDED THAT
A QUIET TITLE ACTION IN 1946 FOUND THE SIX
ACRES IN QUESTION TO BELONG IN DAVIS COUNTY
It appears that whenever an Appellate Court becomes so
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result oriented, it proceeds to bootstrap its decision with
erroneous and wrong conclusions that are not supported by the
record.
On page 2 of the Appellate Court's decision it reads as
follows:
In March, 1946, title to the 18 acres
tract near the border separating Davis
and Weber Counties was quieted in Tasma
Dansie in a decree that contained a
legal description of the tract and
characterized it as lying in Davis
County.
The Defendant-Appellants prepared an Exhibit "C" which
is located between pages 432 and 433 of the record which depicts
and shows the 1946 quiet title action.

The decree described the

property which it found to be Weber County.
identified in yellow.

The decree also described certain property

as being located in Davis County.
in red on the Exhibit.

This property is

This property was identified

The subject 6 acres is depicted in blue.

The 1946 decree shows the subject six acres as being located in
both counties and the Plaintiff-Appellants never questioned the
foregoing in their brief.

(Copy attached marked Exhibit "C")

For the Court of Appeals to conclude facts to the contrary
constitutes a clear usurpation and abuse of its descretion.
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POINT III
THE APPELLATE COURT IN ITS RESULT ORIENTED
DECISION, FOUND IT NECESSARY TO GO OUTSIDE
THE RECORD TO BOOTSTRAP ITSELF IN FINDING A
BASIS TO REVERSE THE LOWER COURT.
The Court of Appeals on page 7 of its decision relied
on some laws and ordinances of the State of Deseret 1850-51 which
it had found on file at the L.D.S. Church Historian office.

A

clear reading of the record and transcripts on file in this case
indicate that none of the foregoing was presented by either party
in the trial below.

Clearly the foregoing deprives the parties

from having a fair trial on the issues in the case.

If indeed

some additional information was found, in the historical office
of the L.D.S. Church, the case should be remanded to the trial
court for furth€*r consideration.
The reasoning of the Appellate Court is clearly
erroneous and prejudicial to conclude that a clear definite
channel of the Weber River existed in any of the years 1850,
1855, 1866, or 1886.

The boundary between the two counties was

the Weber River, but where was the river located.

It is

impossible from the record for either the Appellate Court or the
Trial Court to come up with a metes and bounds legal description
of where the Weber River was in the location of the subject
property in the years referred to above.
The survey notes shown in Defendants Exhibits 14, 15
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and 16 were only surveyed along the section lines.

There is

absolutely no legal metes and bounds description of the Weber
River outside of the section lines.
This Court, though it was not present to hear the
evidence and see the demeanor of the witnesses, concluded the
trial court was wrong when it ruled that a controversy did not
exist at all times prior to 1893 as to the location of the Weber
River so as to allow Davis and Weber Counties to invoke the
provisions of the 1888 compiled Laws of Utah § 86 which reads as
follows:
Whenever any dispute or uncertainty
shall arise as to any county boundary, the
same may be determined by the county surveyors
of the counties interested, and in case they
fail to agree, or otherwise fail to establish
the boundary, the county courts of either or
both counties interested, may engage the
service of the aforesaid Territorial Commissioner, who, with the said county surveyors,
or either of them, if but one appear for that
purpose, shall proceed forthwith to permanently
determine such boundary line at the expense
of the counties interested by making the
necessary surveys and erecting suitable monuments to designate said boundaries, which shall
be deemed permanent until superseded by legislative enactment. Nothing in this act shall be
construed to give the surveyors, mentioned herein, any further authority than to erect suitable
monuments to designate said boundaries as they
are now established by law.
Clearly the record and transcripts in this case reveal
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this case was to be decisive of the boundary between Davis and
Weber Counties (page 16 of the transcript of the hearing on
August 4, 1986 before Judge Roth).
Exhibits "C", "H" and "E" attached to the DefendantRespondents' brief clearly show that a dispute existed between
Davis and Weber Counties as to the location of the Weber River in
the years prior to 1893. Weber and Davis Counties were not
trying to establish a boundary other than the location of the
Weber River, but where was the Weber River located.
CONCLUSION
The Reversal by the Court of Appeals is totally
contrary to the evidence presented.

It can only be assumed that

something was presented to the Court of Appeals that created some
kind of bias or prejudice against the Respondents in this case.
The foregoing manifested itself in the result oriented decision
rendered in this case.

There is absolutely nothing in the record

in this case for the Court of Appeals to conclude that a metes
and bounds description existed of the location of the Weber River
prior to 1894. That a controversy existed as to the location of
the Weber River in 1893 so to cause the two Respondent Counties
to have concern where the boundary between their two counties was
located.
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The foregoing further manifests itself in the refusal
of the Court of Appeals to allow the Respondent Utah Department
of Transportation to litigate the issue of whether the tax sale
was conducted properly by Davis County.
It is abundantly clear the Court of Appeals exceeded
its discretion and went outside the issues raised on appeal and
the arguments and evidence presented in order to arrive at its
decision of reversal and refusal to allow the Respondent Utah
Department of Transportation to try the issues raised in its
answer.
The Court of Appeals was very shortsighted because by
this ruling it does total violence to the location of the current
boundary between Weber and Davis Counties.

Instead of helping to

permanently locate the boundary between Weber and Davis Counties,
this decision will create utter chaos.
The decision of the Appellate Court to reverse the
decision of the Trial Court will not put this case to rest, but
only serve to increase future litigation and appeals and create
confusion as to where the boundary is between Davis and Weber
Counties.
DATED this

/

day of December, 1989.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

STEPHEN C' WARD
Assistant Attorney General
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Assistant Weber County Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the

/

day of December, 1989,

four copies each of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing of
Respondents Utah Department of Transportation, Weber County and
Davis County, were mailed to:
Glen E. Fuller, Esq.
Attorney for Appellants
245 North Vine, #608
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Gerald Hess
Assistant Davis County Attorney
Davis County Courthouse
Farmington, Utah 84025
Mark DeCaria
Assistant Weber County Attorney
Municipal Building
Ogden, Utah 84403
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EXHIBITS

to acquire title when taxes were unpaid, or to convey title
through a tax deed.2 UDOT also pleaded collateral estoppel
based on a 1978 judgment dismissing a damage action by Ronald
Baxter*s former cotenant, Toone, against the contractor UDOT
permitted to remove gravel from the property adjoining the
Baxters'.
In February 1983, the trial court granted UDOT summary
judgment on the collateral estoppel defense. Because Toone was
determined not to be the owner of the adjacent property in the
1978 judgment—based on a jury's determination that it lies

2. As an alternative defense# UDOT also pleaded that the 1969
tax deed from Davis County was invalid because statutory tax sale
procedures were not followed. In its brief, UDOT
mentioned—without citing us to the record—that trial of its two
defenses was "bifurcated" by the trial court# with the separate
trial on the alleged tax sale invalidity to be heard only if UDOT
failed to establish the tax deed invalidity at the first trial by
proving its allegation that the six acres lie within the
boundaries of Weber County. Our independent scrutiny of the
record before us in this ten-year-old action has unearthed no
oral or written motion for such a bifurcation, see Utah R. Civ.
P. 7(b)(1), a request presumably governed by Utah R. Civ. P.
42(b), and no order of the court granting such a request. See
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(b)(2). The issue of the validity of the tax
sale proceedings that led to the 1969 tax deed was not raised by
anyone at the pretrial hearing or explicitly preserved in a
pretrial order in this case for later resolution. Indeed, there
is no mention of this defense in the record before this court
other than in UDOT's pleading. In light of these circumstances,
UDOT must be deemed to have abandoned this alternative defense,
and it is not entitled to another trial on this alternate theory
if the judgment appealed from here, which is based on the
purported location of the subject six acres within Weber County,
cannot withstand appellate review.
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1

THE COURT:

Is it going to be confusing to the jurors

2

to hear that they are parties to the action even though they

3

are not going to make any determination that f s going to affect

4

either county, they wouldn't be asked to answer any questions?

5 I

MR. WARD:

I wouldn't think so, not in the first portion

6

of the trial that f s going to take place, because we are talking

?

about whether--! think it would be more confusing to the Jury

8 J if Weber and Davis Counties were not in and they would speculate

9

why aren't they in, because presumably it is going to be determ-

10

inative of where the boundary is between the two counties

H

MR. FULLER:

I think it would be preiudicial to have

12

the counties in because I think Mr. Ward's attempt is to try to

13

show that both counties support his position.

And I think to

14 I make it a fair trial, the counties shouldn't be involved in the
^

1 litigation there

16
17

MR. WARD:

Well, they were involved in the first one.

They were p a r t — D a v i s County was a party to the first one.

18

^Well,^your Honor, if the Court is inclined to j o that, we

19

will withdraw our^tj-pulati^n wj^t^ Mr^. Hess .

20

to ^ keep ^them J.n_the m law sui t.

IJ^that^s. going

21

MR. HESS:

For crying out loud.

22

MR. WARD:

We think thev should be in the law suit,

23

your Honor.

24

MR. HESS:

2

THE COURT:

^ I

If that ! s the c a s e —
Wait a minute, just sit down.

f-

.

l#

o'J

The whole

16
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